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With a view to protecting the interests of investors in public companies more effectively, current 
Australian corporate law imposes on certain market participants a duty of continuous disclosure 
of key financial and other information concerning the business and affairs of a company.  This is 
designed to promote transparency and, ultimately, foster a fair, efficient and competitive capital 
market environment. If this lofty objective is to be achieved, it is imperative that the law relating 
to continuous disclosure is robustly enforced. Private parties can play a significant role in this 
regard. By complementing the enforcement efforts of public regulatory authorities, the private 
enforcement process increases the chances that violations of the law will be found out and 
pursued.  In the recent case of Brookfield Multiplex Limited v International Litigation Funding 
Partners Pte Ltd (2009) 27 ACLC 1610; [2009] FCAFC 147, the Full Federal Court of Australia 
considered shareholder class litigation facilitated by commercial litigation funders to challenge 
an alleged failure to observe the continuous disclosure laws. The majority made a finding 
characterising the actions of the class litigants, their lawyers and the litigation funders as giving 
rise to a managed investment scheme subject to regulation under the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth). If allowed to stand, this decision has the potential to discourage the funding of private 
litigation seeking to challenge suspected contraventions of the continuous disclosure regime.  A 
reduction in private enforcement is, in turn, likely to lead to less than optimum enforcement of the 
law.  As well, unless reversed, the decision is likely to discourage the use of the class action 
procedure in proceedings seeking to enforce the law in this area. Given the important role that 
class actions play in resolving in one law suit the claims of numerous individuals having a 
common legal position, the decision is apt to undermine judicial efficiency. These are very 
weighty matters.  In order to overcome these problems, the Commonwealth Government has 
announced its intention to introduce reforms to alleviate the regulatory burden introduced by the 
Full Federal Court.  This development is most welcome.  By reforming the law to remove the 
undesirable effects of the Multiplex decision, policy makers will serve the interests of investors 
and society generally better. This paper considers the impact of the Multiplex decision and 
explores ways in which the law can be reformed to overcome its effects. 
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1 INTRODUCTION. 
In an article entitled „What Publicity Can Do‟ published in Harper’s Weekly1  in 1913, Louis 
Dembitz Brandeis, who was later to be appointed a Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, made the now famous observation that „sunlight  is . . . the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.‟2  In that same work, he urged that publicity, which 
he described as a potent force, „be utilized in many ways as a continuous remedial measure.‟3   
In keeping with these sentiments, Australian policy makers have made mandatory, timely 
disclosure of certain key financial and other information concerning the business and affairs 
of a company, and which is likely to affect the value of its securities, a central feature of the 
nation‟s corporate regulatory regime.4 This is out of the belief that market transparency is one 
of the most effective mechanisms of protecting the interests of investors in public companies 
and, more generally, the economic order of society.5  Apparently, with the exposure generated 
by full disclosure, listed companies and other disclosing entities are denied the opportunity to 
pass themselves off for what they are not.  This, it is believed, goes to the general benefit of 
the investing public and, more generally, society as a whole.  In this regard, Brandeis‟ 
observation that „if the broad light of day could be let in upon men‟s actions, it would purify 
                                                 
1
 Harper's Weekly (A Journal of Civilization) was an American political magazine based in New York 
City. It was published from 1857 until 1916 and featured foreign and domestic news, fiction, essays on 
many subjects and humour.  It distinguished itself by criticizing corruption in public life. 
2
 See  http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196 (date accessed 2 April 2010). 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 2M and Ch 6CA.  See further Robert P Austin and Ian M 
Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, (14th ed, 2009) 570-72  [10.010];  Mark Blair and Ian 
Ramsay, „Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Rules and Securities Regulation‟ in Gordon Walker, Brent 
Fisse and Ian Ramsay (eds), Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (1998) 55-7. 
5
 See Part 2 below for further comments on this matter. 
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them as the sun disinfects‟6  appears to have made an impression on Australian policy makers  
once again. 
It is, however, an observed fact, that the law which governs the disclosure of relevant 
information is not self implementing.  Action must be taken to enforce its observance.  If, 
therefore, the lofty objectives which the continuous disclosure regime seeks to promote are to 
be realised, the legal system must provide a reliable mechanism for enforcing the relevant 
applicable rules.7  Unless that is done, those edicts are bound to deteriorate into voluntary 
obligations which participants in the financial markets may or may not observe according to 
their whims.8  For, „legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen 
in the law but that are elusive to the grasp.‟9 
Recognising this, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia has established an 
independent, public regulatory authority, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission,10 to administer all aspects of Australia‟s corporate law.  Under its charter, ASIC 
is required to take whatever action it can take, and is necessary, in order to enforce and give 
effect to the laws of the Commonwealth that confer functions and powers on it.11  
                                                 
6 
See further Sunlight Intern, „Brandeis and the History of Transparency‟ 
http://blog.sunlightfoundation.com/2009/05/26/brandeis-and-the-history-of-transparency/ (date 
accessed 2 April 2010). 
7
 For more on this see Ross Cranston, Law, Government and Public Policy, 1987, 21-5. 
8
 See Donald H Ziegler, „Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in 
Federal Courts‟ (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 665, 678. 
9
 The Western Maid 257 US 419, 433 (1922). 
10
 Hereafter referred to as „ASIC‟. 
11
 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 1(2)(g). 
The laws that confer functions and powers on ASIC include the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). ASIC also has functions under 
other laws.  It has the added responsibility of administering the laws designed to promote the integrity 
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Although there is in place a robust system of public enforcement, the law at the same time 
reserves to private parties a significant role in the enforcement of the rules relating to 
continuous disclosure. Section 1325 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) empowers every 
person who suffers loss as a result of a contravention of the continuous disclosure regime, 
established under Chapter 6CA of the Act, to take action to recover their loss from any person 
involved in that contravention.  There is a strong view that complementary action by both 
public authorities and private parties is essential if optimum enforcement of the law in this 
area is to be achieved. 12 
In the recent case of Brookfield Multiplex Limited v International Litigation Funding 
Partners Pte Ltd,13 the Full Federal Court of Australia considered class litigation challenging 
an alleged failure to observe the continuous disclosure laws. These proceedings were 
facilitated by financial assistance provided by commercial litigation funders.  In their 
decision, the majority made a finding characterising the actions of the class litigants in that 
case, their lawyers and the litigation funders as constituting a managed investment scheme, 
subject to regulation under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
If allowed to stand, the Federal Court decision is bound to have catastrophic implications for 
the effective enforcement of the continuous disclosure laws.  Imposing on litigation funders 
or private litigants‟ lawyers the regulatory burden associated with operating managed 
investment schemes is likely to significantly raise the financial cost of challenging 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the Australian payments system and the insurance and superannuation industries.  However, its 
primary responsibility is to administer the national scheme laws governing corporations in Australia. 
12
 See generally James Mayanja, „Promoting Enhanced Enforcement of Directors‟ Fiduciary Obligations:  
The Role of Public Law Sanctions‟ (2007) 21 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 157, 161-9;  Peta 
Spender, „Securities Class Actions: A View From the Land of the Great White Shareholder‟ (2002) 31 
Common Law World Review 123, 127; Alan  Cameron, „Getting the Regulatory Mix Right‟ (1994) 4 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 122;  Andrew Cassidy and Larelle Chapple,   Australia's 
Corporate Disclosure Regime: Lessons From the US Model‟ (2003) 15 Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 81, 88. 
13
 (2009) 27 ACLC 1610; [2009] FCAFC 147. 
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contraventions of the continuous disclosure regime.  In turn, this is bound to reduce the 
profitability of mounting such challenges.  Eroding the potential profits of such litigation is 
likely to reduce the incentive of litigation funders and lawyers to take on cases of suspected 
non-disclosure.  A reduction in enforcement action by private parties and, consequently, less 
than optimum enforcement of the law, is likely to occur if funding to challenge suspected 
breaches of the continuous disclosure rules is not readily available.   
Related to this, reducing the incentive for litigation funders to support actions challenging 
alleged contraventions of the continuous disclosure laws has the potential to discourage the 
use of the class action procedure in litigation of this type.  To the extent that it does so, the 
decision is bound to undermine judicial efficiency. Class actions serve the important function 
of facilitating efficient adjudication by the courts, in a single proceeding, of the rights of 
numerous individuals who share a common legal position.   
In the endeavours to overcome these difficulties, the Commonwealth Government has 
decided to introduce reforms to alleviate the regulatory burden foisted on litigation funders 
and lawyers by the Full Federal Court.14  This initiative is to be welcomed. Reforming the law 
to remove the undesirable effects of the Multiplex decision promises to serve the interests of 
investors and society generally better, thereby promoting greater investor and social welfare. 
This article examines the Multiplex decision in detail and offers some prescriptions as to the 
ways in which the law can be reformed to overcome its adverse effects. 
This study is organised as follows. First, the current regime of continuous disclosure and the 
policy reasons underlying it are outlined.  Second, the article sets out the case for a strong 
system of private enforcement of the law relating to mandatory, timely release of price 
                                                 
14
 See Commonwealth, „Government Acts to Ensure Access to Justice for Class Action Member‟   
(Media Release No 039, 4 May 2010). Available at 
http://mfsscl.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/039.htm&pageID=003&min=
ceba&Year=&DocType= (date accessed 5 May 2010). 
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sensitive information.  Third, the potential deleterious effects of the Full Federal Court 
decision in the Multiplex litigation on private enforcement are considered, thereby proffering 
a rationale for the need for the reform proposed to be taken by the Commonwealth 
government. Next, the paper explores ways in which the law could be reformed in order to 
surmount the adverse effects of the Multiplex decision. Finally, some conclusions follow. 
2 CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE AND THE RAISON D’ETRE FOR IT 
Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rule 3.1 imposes an obligation of continuous disclosure 
on every disclosing entity.15  Pursuant to this rule, a listed entity is required immediately to 
notify the Australian Stock Exchange16 of any information concerning the entity of which it is 
or becomes aware and which a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on 
the price or value of the entity‟s securities. 17  Section 674 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
reinforces this rule and goes on to give statutory effect to it.  That provision requires every 
listed entity to comply with the ASX listing rule governing continuous disclosure just noted.18  
The requirement to disclose price sensitive information as soon as a disclosing entity 
                                                 
15
 The term „disclosing entity‟ is defined in Part 1.2A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) as an entity that 
has issued enhanced disclosure securities.  Essentially, this includes listed companies and managed 
investment schemes; unlisted companies and managed investment schemes that have conducted 
regulated offers with the result that they have 100 shareholders or interest holders in the relevant class; 
and debenture issuers.  See further Robert Baxt, Ashley Black and Pamela Hanrahan, Securities and 
Financial Services Law, (7th ed, 2008)  17 [1.23]  
16
 Hereafter referred to as „ASX‟. 
17
 See further Baxt, Black and Hanrahan, above n 15, 226 [7.3]; Entcho Raykovski, „Continuous 
Disclosure: Has Regulation Enhanced the Australian Securities Market?‟  (2004) 30 Monash University 
Law Review 269, 281-2. 
18
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674(2).  As to the effect of this provision see Raykovski, above n 17, 
282-4. 
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becomes aware of it is in addition to the periodic annual and half yearly financial reporting 
required of such entities.19 
The intention of policy makers in imposing these requirements on certain entities operating 
within the economy is to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the idea of caveat 
emptor.20  It is an observed fact that shares are intricate merchandise.  „Investors cannot 
“inspect” a business in a way that enables them to deduce future profits.‟21  As a result, the 
value of securities, which are claims to the future income of firms, can only be properly 
ascertained by examining all information relevant to them.22  Mandated, meaningful 
continuous disclosure plays an important role in this respect.  It assists to prevent selective, 
and perhaps, self-serving disclosure.  By making available to the investing public all 
available relevant information about securities in which they might invest, or have invested, 
mandatory full disclosure facilitates reliable pricing of stock by the market.  This assists „the 
small investor to identify and invest in higher quality and lower risk securities.‟23  In short, it 
appears that removing informational deficiencies between market participants, through 
mandatory disclosure, is essential to ensure a fair, informed, efficient and competitive capital 
market.24 Indeed, in his second reading speech while introducing the Corporate Law Reform 
(No 2) Bill 1992, Senator Bolkus argued that: 
                                                 
19
 As to these see Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Part 2M. 
20
 Karoly S Gutman, „Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule‟ (1983) 58 New 
York University Law Review 621, 630. 
21
 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, „Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors‟ 
(1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 669, 673-4. 
22
 Victor Brudney, „A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations‟ (1967) 21 Rutgers Law Review 609, 613 et 
seq;  Austin and Ramsay above n 4, 1112 [22.010]. 
23
 See further John C Coffee Jr, „Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System‟ (1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 717, 723. 
24
 Austin and Ramsay above n 4, 571 [10.010];   Blair and Ramsay above n 4, 57; Easterbrook and 
Fischel, above n 21, 673;  Gutman, above n 20, 630. 
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the government considers it essential that there be timely 
disclosure of relevant information about the financial position 
and prospects of entities in which Australians invest.  It is 
essential to enable informed judgments on investment decisions, 
whether made by individual Australians or by large institutional 
investors.  In every case the principle is the same - disclosure of 
relevant information about an investment and access to such 
information, either directly or through advisers, is necessary to 
ensure an equitable and efficient investment system. 
. . . 
An effective disclosure system will often be a significant 
inhibition on questionable corporate conduct.  Knowledge that 
such conduct will be quickly exposed to the glare of publicity, 
as well as criticism by shareholders and the financial press, 
makes it less likely to occur in the first place.25 
Further to this, policy makers are concerned to „promote the confident and informed 
participation of investors and consumers in the financial system.‟26 A system of full and 
timely disclosure goes a long way to attain this goal. Arguably, it assists investors, at all 
material times, to make informed and rational decisions about their investments.  It is 
perceived that without adequate, reliable information, the market would be characterised by 
rumour, speculation or even fear. Mandatory continuous disclosure can greatly assist to 
overcome this problem.  It is a reliable means of keeping false information to a minimum and 
in the process protecting investors against securities fraud.27 In the words of Senator Bolkus, 
once again, „a well informed market leads to greater investor confidence and in turn to a 
greater willingness to invest in Australian business.‟28  A heightened willingness by the 
general public to participate in the capital markets is likely to promote a more efficient 
                                                 
25
 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 26 November 1992, 3581 (Senator Nick Bolkus, 
Minister for Administrative Services). 
26
 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 1(2)(b).   
27
 See Austin and Ramsay above n 4, 571 [10.010]; Blair and Ramsay above n 4, 57;  Easterbrook and 
Fischel, above n 21, 673;  SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, Doc 95, 88th Cong 1st 
Session, Pt 3 p 1 (1933) quoted in Christopher G G Hogg, „A Takeover Law for New Zealand - An 
American Perspective‟ (1985) 15 Victoria University of Wellington  Law Review 101, 117. 
28
 Commonwealth, above n 25, 3581.  See further Raykovski, above n 17, 269. 
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system for the financing of the operations of Australian companies.  And, the presence of 
efficient capital markets is apt to facilitate the movement of money to those who can use it 
most effectively, thereby promoting a more efficient allocation of societal resources.29 These 
ideals, if achieved, will likely lead to greater national progress. 
However, there is a view among some commentators that although it is beneficial in some 
ways, a requirement of mandatory disclosure is not necessarily desirable.  It imposes 
significant costs on the regulated while it not absolutely essential for the protection of 
investors. The argument is made by these critics that companies appreciate the value of 
information to investors. As the availability of pertinent information reduces uncertainty 
about their operations, companies have an incentive to release information on a voluntary 
basis.  Companies that do so will be able to reduce the cost to themselves of raising and 
retaining capital, so the argument continues.30   
This line of reasoning is certainly respectable.  However, while this may be so, it would 
appear that voluntary disclosure cannot be relied on to protect investors in all circumstances 
against opportunistic behaviour by corporate management.  It is not sufficient to ensure the 
release of optimum information to the market.  While companies may have an incentive to 
release good news which may assist them to maintain or raise their share price, there is no 
guarantee that the information so published will have been optimally verified.  There is also a 
high probability that they might withhold the release of bad news, to the possible detriment of 
investors.  In any event, social waste is bound to ensue if all participants in the market have to 
take action privately to collect, assess and confirm relevant information. These considerations 
strengthen the case for a requirement of mandatory continuous disclosure.31 
                                                 
29
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 21, 673;  Raykovski, above n 17, 277. 
30
 See for example Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 21, 680-5. 
31
 On this see further Coffee Jr, above n 23, 737-43;  Raykovski, above n 17, 272-5. 
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Although the present system of corporate law provides for continuous disclosure, it cannot be 
gainsaid, as has already been observed, that unless it is enforced, the objectives which this 
law seeks to promote be will not be attained.32  Enforcement by private parties can assist 
significantly in this regard.  The ensuing discussion considers this matter more fully.  
3 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE 
REGIME. 
3.1 Preliminary considerations 
Ideally, all violations of the law which requires participants in capital markets to disclose 
information that is likely to affect the value of a company‟s securities should be pursued to 
the point where the marginal benefit of enforcement is equal to its cost.  Current 
arrangements go some way in meeting this objective. 
A public regulatory authority, ASIC, has been established to administer all aspects of the 
nation‟s corporations laws.33  To discharge that responsibility, ASIC has been vested with 
very wide powers.  To enforce the law, it may seek criminal sanctions34 and civil remedies35 
from the courts.  In the alternative, it may invoke administrative remedies.36  However, even 
though there is available a system of public enforcement, there are some residual problems 
which make it unlikely that the law relating to continuous disclosure will be enforced to the 
                                                 
32
 See Part 1 above: Introduction. 
33
 See text accompanying notes 10-11 above. 
34
 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 49. 
35
 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), s 50. 
36
 These include infringement notices (see Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 
(Cth), Part 9.4AA and enforceable undertakings - Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 (Cth), s 93AA. 
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optimum level within that system alone.37 This renders simultaneous, complementary 
enforcement of the continuous disclosure regime by private parties highly desirable.38 
In the first place, the costs of public enforcement are a charge on the public purse.  Unless the 
Parliament appropriates adequate funds to the task of corporate regulation, the public 
enforcer will not be able to act in respect of all violations of the law which should be 
pursued.39 This much has been recognised by many commentators.  Indeed, Mr Alan 
Cameron, a former Chairman of ASIC, once realistically observed that the national corporate 
regulator is not now and is not likely in the future to be funded to deal with all breaches of 
corporate law.40   
Because of this under-funding, the public enforcer [ASIC] is unlikely to concern itself with 
breaches of the law that affect solely private interests.  Rather, it is most likely to take on 
those serious violations of the law likely to have a substantial impact on the corporate 
governance process as a whole.  The strategy will be to select those cases which can be made 
examples of for the purpose of promoting compliance and deterrence.41 
                                                 
37
 The discussion in this section has benefited substantially from my Note „Enforcing the Directors' 
Statutory Duty of Honesty‟ (1997) 7 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 268, 272-4.  See also 
Mayanja, above n 12, 161-9. 
38
 On the role of private enforcement see generally Richard Posner,  Economic Analysis of Law, (6th ed 
2003) 634-6;  Ian Ramsay, „Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a 
Statutory Derivative Action‟ (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 149, 152; 
Maureen Brunt,  „The Role of Private Actions in Australian Restrictive Practices Enforcement‟ (1990) 
17 Melbourne University Law Review 582, 601-2;  Philip Alston, „Representative Class Action in 
Environmental Litigation‟ (1973) 9 Melbourne University Law Review 307, 308. 
39 
Posner, above n 38,  634-5;  Cameron, above n 12,  123;  Brunt, above n 38,  601-2;  Alston, above n 
38, 308;  Ramsay, above n 38, 152;  John Duns, „A Silent Revolution: The Changing Nature of 
Sanctions in Companies and Securities Legislation‟ (1991) 9 Company and Securities Law Journal 
365,  371. 
40
 Cameron, above n 12, 123. 
41 
Brunt, above n 38, 595-6 and 601-2;  Cameron, above n 12, 123. 
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Cost considerations aside, the public enforcer might, either arbitrarily42 or as a result of 
political pressure,43 refrain from proceeding against particular breaches of the law.  In 
addition, the public enforcer may on occasions fail to act to stem violations of the law out of 
a lack of a proper regulatory ideology or mere bureaucratic inertia.  As Galbraith once 
observed, regulatory agencies tend with the passage of time to „mellow and become with 
some exception, either an arm of the industry they regulate or senile.‟44 
It thus appears that exclusive reliance upon public enforcement might result in an 
enforcement gap.45  In the circumstances, it is advisable that the rules governing continuous 
disclosure are open to both public and private enforcers.  „The availability of private 
enforcement may serve a fail-safe function and ensure greater stability in the application of 
the law.‟46  In addition, by making it possible for private enforcers to take up cases which the 
                                                 
42 In this connection, ASIC‟s failure to prosecute Mr Steve Vizard, a prominent business person, over 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties arising from some share trades furnishes a very convenient 
illustration.  For a more detailed discussion of this affair see Ian Ramsay, „Steve Vizard, Insider 
Trading and Directors‟ Duties‟ (2005) 15 CCH Australian Corporate News 177;  Henry Thornton, „The 
Vizard affair‟, http://www.henrythornton.com/article.asp?article_id=3357 (date accessed 25 March 
2010.   
43 
On the problems of political interference see generally Cranston, above n 7, 29-30;  Peter N Grabosky 
& John Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory 
Agencies, 1986, Chapter 2. 
44 
Quoted by Mr Leigh Masel, inaugural Chairman of the defunct National Companies and Securities 
Commission in the preface to Understanding the New Takeover Code, 1980, 4.  See also Posner, above 
n 38, 635;  Brunt, above n 38, 606;  Ramsay, above n 38 at 152;  Cranston, above n 7, 27-8. 
 
On the theory that public regulatory agencies tend to serve the interests of the regulated rather than the 
public interest (the capture theory), see Ross F Cranston, „Regulation and Deregulation: General 
Issues‟ (1982) 5 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 17 et seq. 
45 
Posner, above n 38, 635. 
46 
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and 
Recommendations (Tentative Draft No 1), 1982, 220-21.  This discussion was not carried over in the 
final report. 
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public enforcer would otherwise not consider worth pursuing, and vice-versa, complementary 
enforcement increases the chances that violations of the law will be found out and pursued.47 
Further, the availability of both public and private enforcement exposes potential violators to 
a wider array of sanctions.  That prospect might go a long way in discouraging entities which 
issue enhanced securities from flouting the applicable continuous disclosure laws.48
 
  Duality 
of enforcement has the further advantage that it might lighten the burden of the public 
enforcer.  Public resources need not be applied where the requisite level of deterrence can be 
achieved through the initiative, energies and expertise of private enforcers.49 An added 
advantage is that „when the legal system assigns a substantial enforcement role to private 
litigation, . . . the tendency of . . . public agencies to expand their jurisdiction is less likely to 
produce excessive bureaucratic regulation of private enterprise.‟50 
3.2 Pursuing contraventions of the continuous disclosure regime 
Available evidence indicates that since the inception of the continuous disclosure regime in 
1999, private parties have taken action before the courts on several occasions to challenge 
conduct engaged in by disclosing entities in breach of the relevant applicable rules. This has 
mainly been through the instrumentality of class actions initiated by shareholders to obtain 
                                                 
47 
Indeed, the Australian Securities Commission (the predecessor of ASIC) used this argument to support 
initiatives aimed at promoting greater private enforcement of corporate law.  See ASC, Submission to 
the Inquiry by the House Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs into Corporate 
Practices and the Rights of Shareholders, December 1990, 128. 
48 
See generally Ramsay, above n 38, 152. 
49 
Brunt, above n 38, 609;  John Kluver,  „ASC Investigations and Enforcement: Issues and 
Initiatives‟(1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 31, 54;  D E  Harding, „The 
Role of Lawyers in the Regulation of Economic Activity‟ in David Hambly & John L Goldring,  
Australian Lawyers and Social Change, 1976, 214. 
50 
American Law Institute, above n 46, 220-21. 
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damages.  The table below gives some idea of the enforcement actions taken so far by private 
parties seeking to challenge alleged contraventions of the continuous disclosure rules.51 
Table A 
 
Company Breach date Commenced Resolved Result 
GIO Australia 
Ltd 
1998 1999 2003 $112M 
settlement 
Concept Sports 
Ltd  
2004 2004 2006 Confidential 
settlement 
approximately 
$5M) 
Aristocrat 
Leisure Ltd 
2002-3 2003 2006 $145M 
settlement 
Telstra 2005 2005 2007 $5M settlement 
Ion Ltd 2003-4 2006 pending  
Village Life Ltd 2003-5 2006 2009 Less than $5M 
settlement 
Sons of Gwalia 
Ltd 
2000-4 2006 2007 $125M 
settlement 
MediaWorld 
Communications 
Ltd 
2000-4 2005 pending  
Multiplex Group 
Ltd 
2004-5 2006 pending  
Australian Wheat 
Board Ltd 
2002-6 2007 pending  
Downer EDI Ltd 2006 2007 2008 
Confidential 
settlement 
(believed to be  
approximately 
$20M) 
Evans and Tate 
Ltd 
2004-5 2007 pending  
Centro Property 
Group 
2007 2008 pending  
Credit Corp 
Group 
2007-8 2006 pending  
                                                 
51 Source:  Bernard Murphy, „Class Actions and Litigation Funding‟ (Paper presented at the 2010 Annual 
Corporate Law Teachers‟ Association Conference, Adelaide Australia, 8-9 February 2010, 8. 
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Oz Minerals 2008 2009 pending  
It can be said with confidence that this shareholder activism has been facilitated in large 
measure by the implementation of two important initiatives: (1) the introduction of reforms in 
some Australian jurisdictions which have made access to litigation funding easier; and (2) the 
availability of a procedure which provides a means for aggregating numerous relatively small 
but viable claims into one large enough to justify incurring the often heavy cost of litigation. 
3.2.1 Pursuing contraventions of the continuous disclosure regime: the funding 
dimension. 
Under current law, the costs of litigation follow the event.  This general rule entitles the 
successful party to recover from his or her adversary the costs reasonably incurred in 
conducting or defending the proceedings.  The successful party, however, still remains liable 
to his or her own solicitor in respect of the expenses not indemnified by the other party. 52 
By imposing on the plaintiff the risk of litigation costs, which can be substantial given the 
high cost of legal services, the costs indemnity rule would ordinarily discourage the bringing 
of private suits to challenge non-observance of the continuous disclosure rules.  As Professor 
Williams has pointed out, a practice that ensures that the plaintiff, though successful, will 
finish out of pocket hardly provides an incentive to sue. 53   
                                                 
52 
Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2); Moir v Wallersteiner (No 2) [1975] Q B 373; Australian Law Reform 
Commission, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court, Report No 46, AGPS Canberra, 1988, [254]-
[256];  Bernard C Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, (7th ed 2007),  492-7. 
53 
Neil J Williams, „Consumer Class Actions in Canada - Some Proposals for Reform‟ (1975) 13 
Osgoode Hall Law Review 1, 45.  See also Cassidy and Chapple, above n 12, 91;   Industrial Property 
Law Reform Committee, Practice and Procedures for Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights in 
Australia, 1992, [4.8];  Ramsay, above n 38, 162-4;  Alston, above n 38, 308. 
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This problem has been partly met.  Assisted litigation is now available in Australia in some 
limited cases54 especially those involving companies.55  Following reforms which have seen 
the abolition of the tort/crime of maintenance and champerty in some Australian jurisdictions, 
it is now becoming increasingly acceptable for private litigation funders56 to provide financial 
assistance to potential litigants who might otherwise not be able to sue because of the cost 
involved, in return for a share of the proceeds of the litigation.57  In addition, while 
contingency fee arrangements under which lawyers may pursue breaches of the law on behalf 
of aggrieved individuals for a share of the proceeds of the litigation are still barred,58  
solicitors now frequently act on a speculative, conditional no win no fee basis whereby they 
are paid their normal fees in the event of a successful outcome as a means of shifting the 
burden of litigation costs from private litigants, including shareholders in class actions.59  
These practices, once frowned upon and seriously discouraged,60 are now embraced on public 
policy grounds.  They are considered desirable to the extent they facilitate improved access to 
                                                 
54
 The tort/crime of maintenance and champerty has now been abolished in New South Wales, Victoria, 
South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory but remains in Queensland, Western Australia, 
Tasmania and the Northern Territory. 
55
 See further Lee Aitken, “„Litigation Lending‟ After Fostif: An Advance in Consumer Protection, or a 
Licence to „Bottomfeeders‟?” (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 171, 172-4. 
56
 There are a number of commercial funders of litigation in Australia, two of which [IMF (Australia) Ltd 
and Hillcrest Litigation Services Ltd] are now listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
57
 For examples of where this has occurred, see in addition to the cases in Table A above, Fostif v 
Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd (2005) 218 ALR 166;  IMF (Australia) Ltd v Sons of Gwalia Ltd 
(Administrator Appointed) (2005) 53 ACSR 657;  Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept 
Sports Ltd [2005] FCAFC 265;  Clairs Keeley (A Firm) v Treacy [2005] WASCA 86;  Dorajay Pty Ltd 
v Aristocrat Leisure Ltd [2004] FCA 634;  Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 143. 
58 
See Clyne v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186, 203; Gino E Dal Pont, Lawyers‟ Professional 
Responsibility, (3rd ed, 2006) 321, [14.135]. 
59
 Murray Gleeson CJ, „Some Legal Scenery‟ (Speech delivered at the Judicial Conference of Australia, 
Sydney, 5 October 2007) 8.  Available at http://www.jca.asn.au/attachments/2007-MurrayGleeson.pdf 
(date accessed 19 April 2010);  Cassidy and Chapple, above n 12, 91. 
60 
See, for example, In re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 2) [1963] Ch 219, 219-22;  Williams v Page (1858) 24 
Beav 654, 665-6;  Alabaster v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339, 342. 
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justice by all members of society.  Indeed in Fostif v Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd,61 
Mason P lucidly enunciated that „the law now looks favourably on funding arrangements that 
offer access to justice so long as any tendency to abuse of process is controlled.‟62 Indeed, as 
another legal luminary perceptively noted, „it is grasped that justice fails radically unless 
citizens, irrespective of means, have access to the professional assistance necessary to 
vindicate their legal rights.‟63 
By protecting potential plaintiffs against the risk of having to pay their lawyers' fees, or of the 
costs of the entire suit if it should fail, these measures have assisted to encourage a 
respectable level of private litigation pursuing contraventions of the applicable continuous 
disclosure rules.64  But, unless action is taken to reverse it, the Full Federal Court decision in 
the Multiplex litigation may have the effect of reversing these advances, as the discussion in 
Part 4 below will attempt to show.  
3.2.2 Pursuing contraventions of the continuous disclosure regime - rendering small 
claims worth taking up: the role of class actions. 
Mechanisms that relieve potential plaintiffs of the burden of litigation expenses, such as those 
outlined above, go a long way to encourage private parties to mount court challenges against 
listed entities which may have failed to comply with their obligations under the mandatory 
continuous disclosure laws.  However, it is fairly obvious that for private funders to agree to 
finance a claim, it must be fairly substantial and the expected returns large enough to justify 
                                                 
61
 (2005) 63 NSWLR 203. 
62
 Ibid [105].  This view was endorsed by the High Court of Australia.  See Campbells Cash and Carry 
Pty Ltd v Fostif (2006) 80 ALJR 1441 [88-93]. 
63
 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Parliament, Cost of Legal Services and Litigation, (1992) [17] – quoting King CJ. 
64
 On this see Table A above. 
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incurring the costs of litigation and associated risks. Similarly, unless a claim is substantial 
enough, lawyers are not likely to pursue it on a conditional, no win no fee basis. 
Ordinarily, however, the individual stakes of investors who claim to be aggrieved by alleged 
contraventions of the continuous disclosure rules are too small to justify bearing the burden 
of obtaining legal redress. 65  So, to render such claims worth pursuing either by lawyers on a 
on a conditional no win, no fee basis or by private commercial litigation funders, it is 
essential to have a mechanism for aggregating numerous relatively small but viable claims 
into one large enough to render litigation worthwhile. 
One technique for aggregating a number of small claims into one large enough to justify the 
cost of litigation is the representative or class action.66  Under this procedure, where there are 
typical claims, numerous plaintiffs and common questions of law or fact, one or more 
members of that class may sue (or be sued) as a representative party on behalf of all potential 
plaintiffs if certain conditions of equity and convenience are fulfilled. 
This procedure is available for the conduct of proceedings before the Federal Court of 
Australia and in the States of Victoria and South Australia.67 Under the rules governing 
proceedings before the Federal Court, where seven or more persons have claims against the 
same person, which claims are all in respect of, or arise out of, the same, similar or related 
circumstances, a representative proceeding may be commenced by any one or more members 
                                                 
65
 See also Spender, above n 12, 124. 
66
    Other methods by which several individual claims may be grouped and disposed of together include 
joinder of plaintiffs and causes of action, consolidation of suits and the selection of test suits.  These 
procedures do not, however, provide a very efficient mechanism for dealing with large numbers of 
claims.  For an analysis of the shortcomings of these procedures, see The Law Reform Commission of 
Australia, above n 52, [46] et seq. 
67
    Significantly, the State of New South Wales has now announced plans to introduce an improved class 
action procedure modelled on the regime operating in the Federal Court.  See Alex Boxsell, „Push for 
Class Actions‟, The Australian Financial Review (Sydney) 9 August 2010, 9. 
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of the group on behalf of others if the claims give rise to at least one substantial common 
issue of law or fact.68  The action may be brought whether or not all rights to relief are in 
respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions.69 The action is 
maintainable even if the relief sought includes a claim for damages70 and even if any damages 
to which any person is entitled will need to be assessed individually.71 
The persons being represented in the proceedings need not consent to be represented.72  
However, they must be notified of the commencement of the proceedings.73  The court may 
not order personal notice of the proceedings to be given to each member of the group 
represented unless it is satisfied that this is reasonably practical and not unduly expensive.74  
Further, any member of the group represented may opt out of the proceedings.75 The 
proceedings may not be settled or discontinued without the approval of court.76 
In Victoria where seven or more persons have the right to the same or substantially the same 
relief against the same person, an action may be commenced as a representative suit by any 
one of them on behalf of all or some of the former if there is a common question of law or 
fact to be tried.77 The action may be brought whether or not all rights to relief are in respect of 
                                                 
68 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C(1). 
69
 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C(2)(b). 
70 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C(2)(ii). 
71 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C(2)(iii). 
72 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33E.
 
73 
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33X(1). 
74
 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Y(5). 
75
 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33J. 
76
 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V. 
77 
Supreme Court of Victoria Act 1986 (Vic), s 33C(1)(a). 
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or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. 78  The action is maintainable as a 
representative action even if any damages to which any person is entitled will need to be 
assessed individually. 79 Persons being represented in the proceedings need not consent to be 
represented.80 
In South Australia, one or more members of a group of numerous persons may commence a 
representative action on behalf of all or some members of the group if common questions of 
law or fact requiring adjudication arise.81 An application must be made to the court for an 
order authorising the action to be maintained as a representative action and for directions as 
to the conduct of the action. 82   Authorisation may not be refused on the ground that the relief 
claimed includes claims for damages that would require individual assessment or that 
separate contracts made with members of the group and the defendant are involved.83  All 
persons being represented in the proceedings must consent in writing to be represented and 
the written authority to represent the group must be filed in the Court when filing originating 
process by which the proceeding is commenced.84 Questions which are common to the group 
must be determined in common proceedings while questions that require the participation of 
individual members of the group may be directed to be dealt with either in separate actions or 
by separate trials within the action. 85 
                                                 
78 
Supreme Court of Victoria Act 1986 (Vic), s 33C(1)(b). 
79 
Supreme Court of Victoria Act 1986 (Vic), s 33C(2)(a)(ii). 
80 
Supreme Court of Victoria Act 1986 (Vic), s 33E(1). 
81 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, 
 
Rule 80(1). 
82 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006,
 
Rule 81. 
83 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006,
 
Rule 81(4). 
84 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, 
 
Rule 80(2). 
85 
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006,
 
Rule 81(5)(d). 
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These procedures enable common questions of law or fact (or both) to be determined together 
including claims for damages. They open the way for the vindication of the rights of 
numerous small claimants which would otherwise go without redress.  Very significantly, 
these procedures facilitate the recovery of compensation in claims that would otherwise not 
be individually pursued.  By enlarging the size of potential claims, the class action procedure 
likely encourages litigation funders to financially assist private enforcers to pursue their 
claims.  It also encourages lawyers to take on such cases on a no win no fee basis.  This 
enables shareholders to achieve a more powerful posture to enforce norms of conduct which 
listed entities would otherwise escape.  The threat of listed companies and other disclosing 
entities being required to make good the loss suffered by several hundred or thousand 
investors may provide a strong incentive to these entities to comply with the continuous 
disclosure laws.86 The capacity of the private enforcement system to protect the integrity of 
the capital markets and the economic order of society in general is, in the process, likely to be 
enhanced.87  However, as the ensuing discussion will shortly demonstrate, because of the 
                                                 
86
 See further the discussion accompanying notes 68-84 above; Spender, above n 12, 136-7. 
87 
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the role, potentialities or defects of class actions as a tool 
for remedying mass wrongs.  For that the reader is referred, merely by way of example, to the 
following works:  Williams, above n 53, 7 et seq;  Mauro Cappelletti, „Vindicating the Public Interest 
Through the Courts: A Comparativist's Contribution‟ (1976) 25 Buffalo Law  Review  643, 667-680;  
Neil Francey, Consumer Class Actions, Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc, Sydney, 
1988;  Michael J Owen, The Extended Class Action in the Australian Context, Australian Industries 
Development Association, Melbourne, 1979;  Kenneth W Dam, „Class Actions: Efficiency, 
Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interests‟ (1975) 4 Journal of Legal Studies 47;  
„Developments - Class Actions‟ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1319; Earl Johnson Jr et al, „Access to 
Justice in the United States: The Economic Barriers and Some Promising Solutions‟ in Mauro 
Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice, Vol I Book II, 1978, 993 et seq;  George J Benston; „A 
Comprehensive Analysis of the Determinants of Private Antitrust Litigation, with Particular Emphasis 
on Class Action Suits and the Rule of Joint and Several Damages‟ in Lawrence J White (ed), Private 
Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning, 1988, 271 et seq;  Anthony J Duggan, „Consumer 
Redress and the Legal System‟ in Anthony J Duggan & Leanna W Darvall (eds), Consumer Protection 
Law and Theory, 1980, 200 et seq;  Mordecai Rosenfeld, „The Impact of Class actions on Corporate 
and Securities Law‟ [1972] Duke Law Journal 1167. 
 Although most of the works cited discuss the role of class actions primarily in the context of consumer 
protection, the issues raised apply with equal force to the enforcement of continuous disclosure law. 
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decision of the Full Federal Court in Multiplex, it may prove hard to harness these benefits.  
This provides further justification for action to reverse it. 
4 THE MULTIPLEX LITIGATION 
P Dawson Nominees Pty Limited and Frederick Henry Hart held shares in Brookfield 
Multiplex Limited and Brookfield Multiplex Funds Management Limited.88 Multiplex was 
involved in the construction of Wembley National Stadium. Ultimately, that project ran 
behind its construction schedule, substantially exceeded budget and consequently did not 
produce a profit. Dawson and Hart commenced representative actions on behalf of 
themselves and other shareholders in the Federal Court of Australia seeking to recover 
damages from Multiplex.89  It was alleged that at all relevant times, Multiplex failed to keep 
the market informed about circumstances relating to the Wembley project, which matters it 
was alleged, had a material effect on the price or value of Multiplex securities. It was claimed 
that this constituted a contravention of s 674 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  
Maurice Blackburn Pty Limited, a firm of solicitors, represented the plaintiffs in both class 
actions. The proceedings were initially financed by 2117980 Ontario Inc.  That company later 
assigned the financing agreement entered into between it and the plaintiffs to International 
Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd.  
Multiplex sought an injunction restraining the funders from providing any money to maintain 
and advance the litigation.  It also sought to prevent Maurice Blackburn from taking any 
further steps in the proceedings.  Multiplex contended that the arrangements between the 
plaintiffs, their lawyers and the litigation funder in respect of these suits constituted a 
                                                 
88
 Hereafter together referred to as „Multiplex‟. 
89 
See P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Multiplex Limited [2007] FCA 1061. 
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managed investment scheme which was required to be, but had not been, registered under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 90 
Multiplex‟s claims were rejected by Finkelstein J at first instance.91  However, on appeal, a 
majority of the Full Federal Court of Australia set aside the primary judge‟s decision.  The 
Full Court held that the arrangements between the representative parties, group members, 
their lawyers and the litigation funder constituted a managed investment scheme as defined in 
paragraph (a) of the definition of that term in section 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).92  
As may be recalled, that provision catches any scheme that has the following characteristics:  
(i) people contribute money or money's worth as 
consideration to acquire rights ( interests ) to benefits 
produced by the scheme (whether the rights are actual, 
prospective or contingent and whether they are 
enforceable or not);  
(ii) any of the contributions are to be pooled, or used in a 
common enterprise, to produce financial benefits, or 
benefits consisting of rights or interests in property, for 
the people (the members ) who hold interests in the 
scheme (whether as contributors to the scheme or as 
people who have acquired interests from holders);  
                                                 
90 
It is worth noting here that on 20 December 2006, Multiplex entered into an enforceable undertaking 
with ASIC relating to its failure to disclose a material change in profit on the Wembley project.  Under 
this undertaking Multiplex, while not admitting that it had contravened any law, agreed to pay a sum 
not exceeding $32 million to the beneficial owners of certain  Multiplex Stapled Securities.  Multiplex 
further agreed to, within 60 days of the undertaking to appoint an external consultant approved by 
ASIC to, among other things, review its policies and procedures for dealing with continuous disclosure.  
For this undertaking see http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/06-
443+ASIC+accepts+an+enforceable+undertaking+from+the+Multiplex+Group?openDocument. (Date 
accessed 19 April 2010). 
91 
Brookfield Multiplex Limited v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (No 3) (2009) 27 
ACLC 712;  [2009] FCA 450 [38]. 
92 
See Brookfield Multiplex Limited v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd (2009) 27 
ACLC 1610; [2009] FCAFC 147. 
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(iii)  the members do not have day-to-day control over the 
operation of the scheme (whether or not they have the 
right to be consulted or to give directions); or  
In coming to their conclusion that this definition of „scheme‟ was satisfied, the majority 
(Sundberg and Dowsett JJ) considered that the promises made by the group members and the 
Litigation Funder could be properly described as money‟s worth and that this was a 
contribution as it was given for the purpose of securing legal services for the group as a 
whole.93  Their Honours went on to say that the provision of legal services at no cost, the 
absence of exposure to any adverse costs order, the Funder‟s promises to provide security for 
costs and the rights to participate in the proceeds of any judgment or settlement were benefits 
produced by the scheme.94 The majority were also of the view that since the individual 
promises of the group members were made for the purposes of the scheme and for the benefit 
of scheme members, their contributions were pooled in the sense required by the 
Corporations Act 2001(Cth).95  Finally, their Honours concluded that the scheme was a 
common enterprise, since it was clearly an undertaking and there was a shared purpose, 
namely to prosecute the group members‟ claims to successful realisation for the benefit of the 
group members, the Funder and the lawyers.96 
4.1 Impact of the Full Court decision: funding 
Unless reversed, the Full Federal Court decision is bound to give rise to some undesirable 
consequences for the private enforcement of the laws governing continuous disclosure.  In 
effect, an attempt to challenge in court a suspected contravention of the relevant law through 
                                                 
93 
Ibid [51]-[63]. 
94 
Ibid [71]-[82]. 
95 
Ibid [61]-[66]. 
96 
Ibid [81]-[100]. 
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representative proceedings and with the assistance of a litigation funder will bring into 
existence a managed investment scheme. As class actions seeking relief in relation to 
contraventions of the continuous disclosure rules usually involve more than 20 litigants, this 
will ordinarily automatically trigger regulation under the Corporations Act. The scheme will 
need to be registered with ASIC97  unless ASIC excuses it from registration.98  For the reasons 
canvassed below, this factor is likely to discourage litigation funders and lawyers from taking 
on cases seeking to challenge contraventions of the continuous disclosure rules. 
The registration of a managed investment scheme under the Corporations Act is a very 
rigorous, time consuming and costly exercise. In the first place, a formal application must be 
lodged with ASIC.99  This application must be accompanied by certain formal documents, 
including copies of the scheme‟s constitution and its compliance plan.100  In addition, a 
product disclosure statement must be prepared and lodged with ASIC before any interest in 
the scheme is offered to the public.101  Further, a person who will be responsible for operating 
                                                 
97
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601EB. 
98
 Following the handing down of the Full Federal Court decision, ASIC announced its readiness to grant 
relief to lawyers and litigation funders involved in assisted class litigation from the requirements of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that would otherwise apply.  This relief is transitional and is granted, on 
individual application, to lawyers and litigation funders involved in the conduct of class actions 
commenced before 4 November 2009.  Applications in respect of class actions commenced after that 
date are considered separately.  This relief will be available until 30 June 2010 so as to allow the 
Commonwealth government to work out a more permanent solution.  See ASIC, ASIC Grants 
Transitional Relief From Regulation for Funded Class Actions, Media Release 09-218MR, Wednesday 
4 November 2009.  Available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/09-
218MR+ASIC+grants+transitional+relief+from+regulation+for+funded+class+actions?openDocument 
(date accessed 25 March 2010). 
By Instrument No 09-00985 dated 18 November 2009, ASIC granted such relief to the lawyers and 
litigation funders involved in the Multiplex litigation – see 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC100_09.pdf/$file/ASIC100_09.pdf., 
21 (date accessed 25 March 2010). 
99
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601(EA)(1). 
100
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601(EA)(4). 
101
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 709. 
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the scheme „the responsible entity‟ must be nominated and their name set out in the 
application for registration.102 The responsible entity must be a public company that holds an 
Australian financial service license that authorises it to operate a managed investment 
scheme.103  Failure to register a scheme, as required, amounts to a breach of the Corporations 
Act. 104 
In the Multiplex litigation, it was acknowledged that both the litigation funder and the 
litigants‟ lawyers performed part of the functions of the scheme operator.105 As a matter of 
fact, this is always likely to be the situation in cases of this nature.  It thus follows that in all 
cases of assisted class litigation challenging contraventions of the continuous disclosure 
regime, either the litigation funder or the litigant‟s lawyer will need to take steps to comply 
with s 601FA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
Other obligations are imposed on the responsible entity.  Under the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), that entity is required to operate the scheme and perform the functions conferred on it 
by the scheme‟s constitution and the Act. 106  In particular, the responsible entity must comply 
with the scheme‟s compliance plan and meet certain obligations in relation to the scheme 
property.107  As well, ongoing disclosure must be made to members of the scheme.108   In 
                                                 
102
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601(EA)(2).  
103
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601(FA). 
104
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601(ED)(5). 
105 
Brookfield Multiplex Limited (ACN 008 687 063) v International Litigation Funding Partners Pte Ltd 
(No 2) (2009) 27 ACLC 1887;  [2009] FCAFC 182, [104] 
106
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601FB(1). 
107
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 601FC(1). 
108
 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 2M.3.  See also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)  s 674. 
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assisted litigation seeking to enforce the continuous disclosure laws, either the litigation 
funder or the litigant‟s lawyer will have to shoulder these additional responsibilities. 109 
The onerous compliance burden thus introduced is bound to reduce the profitability of 
funding arrangements while at the same time rendering them more risky.  This has the 
potential to discourage some litigation funders from providing much need funding to 
prospective private plaintiffs.  It also has the potential to reduce the incentive of lawyers to 
take on cases seeking to challenge suspect contraventions of the continuous disclosure laws 
on a conditional no win no fee basis. This is likely to result in reduced private enforcement 
action.   
4.2 Implications of the Full Court decision: class actions and judicial efficiency 
To date, most private actions challenging alleged contraventions of the continuous disclosure 
laws have been mounted as class actions.  The reasons for this can be found in Parts 3.1.1 and 
3.1.2 above.  To reiterate, class actions allow the aggregation, in a single lawsuit, of the 
claims of numerous persons who share a common legal position. This renders relatively small 
but viable claims large enough and worthy of support by litigation funders or lawyers on a 
conditional fee basis. 
For the reasons just outlined in the previous part, the regulatory burden introduced by the Full 
Federal Court decision in the Multiplex litigation is likely to discourage the launching and 
maintenance of class actions challenging suspect failures to comply with the continuous 
disclosure laws.  Without assured funding and consequently relief from the financial or other 
risks associated with litigation, no person may come forward to act as class representative.  
This is likely to result in reduced private enforcement and, ultimately, less than optimum 
                                                 
109
 On the regulation of managed investment schemes see further Austin and Ramsay above n 4, 1128-30 
[22.090];  Baxt, Black and Hanrahan, above n 15, 99-104 [3.6]-[3.7]. 
Enhancing private enforcement of Australia’s continuous disclosure regime          
 
28 
 
enforcement of the continuous disclosure regime. The law would, consequently, not be fully 
vindicated.  
Another very important consideration regarding class actions is that they not only potentially 
benefit members of the class but serve judicial efficiency as well.110  By facilitating the 
aggregation in a single lawsuit of the claims of numerous persons who share a common legal 
position, class actions offer the opportunity to provide, in one suit, judicial relief for a large 
number of aggrieved individuals.111  In the process, „they serve the important judicial 
functions of achieving economies of time, effort and expense and promoting uniformity of 
adjudication for similarly situated persons.‟112  This goes to promote and enhance social 
welfare. 
The Full Federal Court decision has the potential to undermine these goals. If, as a result of 
lack of funding, no party is willing to come forward to initiate a class action, the alternative is 
for aggrieved shareholders to launch separate cases.  The result could easily be a potentially 
large number of cases involving an identical legal issue.  Undeniably, the expense of such 
undertakings could be enormous.113  Another equally serious problem is that the launching of 
numerous separate actions is bound to result in hugely expensive duplication of filing, 
pleading, discovery and adjudication in the courts. This is bound to unjustifiably to tie up 
judicial resources.114 
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Henry Rose, „Class Actions and the Poor‟ (2007) 6 Pierce Law Review 55, 69. 
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Ibid; Spender, above n 12, 136. 
112 
Rose, above n 110, 69. 
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As well, the launching of multiple separate actions challenging non-compliance with the 
continuous disclosure laws has the potential to create other serious problems.  While the 
claims may raise common legal issues, there is a distinct possibility of the courts reaching 
different results in the separate suits.  The result would be a weakening of the goal of 
uniformity in adjudication.115  This is likely to lead to a reduction in social welfare, given the 
interest of all members of society in judicial systems that hear claims efficiently and avoid 
the inconsistent adjudication problems raised by multiple cases addressing the same legal 
issue. 116  A related serious problem is that because of the expense involved, it is probable that 
many of the persons affected would not take legal action to vindicate their rights at all.  This 
would operate to subvert justice.  These are all very weighty matters, pointing to the need to 
reform the law. 
5 PROPOSED REFORM 
Private plaintiffs play a significant role in promoting optimum enforcement of Australia‟s 
mandatory continuous disclosure regime.  In light of this, the law, while seeking to protect 
shareholders against fraudulent, coercive or manipulative practices, ought to avoid creating 
barriers to private enforcement unless it can be shown that the benefits of such constraints 
outweigh the costs.    
Unless overturned, the law as enunciated by the Full Federal Court decision in the Multiplex 
litigation is likely to give rise to a number of undesirable consequences which are bound to 
impose heavy, unnecessary costs on society.  The decision is likely to discourage litigation 
funders from supporting shareholder actions challenging contraventions of the continuous 
disclosure law.  It is also likely to discourage lawyers from taking on such cases on a no win 
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no fee basis. The real danger here is that in doing so, the decision creates the risk that 
shareholders with justifiable causes of action could be kept out of the courts because of their 
inability to pay the costs of litigation or because of the fear of the financial risks involved.  
This is bound to result in a reduction in the enforcement of the law.  Also, by discouraging 
shareholders aggrieved by alleged contraventions of the continuous disclosure laws from 
launching class actions, the decision is likely to undermine judicial efficiency. 
The preparedness of litigation funders and solicitors to facilitate actions seeking to enforce 
mandatory disclosure laws on behalf of shareholders who, because of financial constraints, 
would otherwise not do so, is a commendable social service.  It promotes greater enforcement 
of the law.  Therefore, the development whereby litigation funders to agree to fund actions 
initiated to enforce corporate law and recover the expenses incurred in taking such action 
from the proceeds of that litigation should not be stifled by the requirement for the parties 
involved in such proceedings to comply with the managed investment schemes regulatory 
regime established by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), as the Full Federal Court decision 
now mandates. 
The law governing the establishment and operation of managed investment schemes is 
designed to protect investors in collective investment schemes.  This is a commendable 
objective.  However, as Finkelstein J rightly observed, this regulatory regime serves no 
meaningful purpose in protecting the interests of shareholders seeking to enforce the 
continuous disclosure laws through assisted litigation. 117  In cases of this nature, the objective 
of protecting the interests of aggrieved investors could be better realised in other existing 
ways. 
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Currently, in the exercise of their powers and discharge of their duties in relation to the 
conduct of litigation, lawyers are subject to fiduciary duties and other canons of professional 
conduct. 118  Of particular significance, these obligations require them to act, to inform, to 
obey instructions, to be competent, to preserve clients‟ confidences, to be loyal, to act with 
honesty, honour, integrity and in good faith. 119  The essence of these obligations is to instil in 
any practitioner the idea that the fundamental duty of a lawyer is to ensure that he or she 
„does all within her or his power to protect the interests of clients.‟120  These obligations are 
rigorously enforced by the Courts and professional regulatory bodies.  Indeed, in Tyrell v 
Bank of London,121  Lord Westbury emphatically stated that „there is no relation known to 
society, of the duties of which it is more incumbent on a court of justice to require a faithful 
and honourable observance, than the relation between a solicitor and client.‟122  These existing 
controls are more than equal to the task of protecting the interests of shareholders 
participating in class actions challenging contraventions of Australia‟s continuous disclosure 
regime against lawyers who may be given to overreaching.   
It is appreciated that there is concern in the community about the potential for the 
commercialisation of litigation by litigation funders.   Indeed, in Re Trepca Mines Ltd (No 
2)123  Lord Denning explained that society was worried about the funding of litigants by third 
parties because „the common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be tempted, for 
his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn 
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witnesses‟.124 This concern is very much alive today.  There is a perception that litigation 
funders might fan litigation to further their financial interest rather for the purpose of 
assisting aggrieved individuals to vindicate their rights, which is the prime objective of civil 
litigation. 125 
Recent experience gives some credence to these fears.  In the recent case of Hall v Poolman126  
there was clear evidence that a damages claim for insolvent trading was initiated by the 
liquidator, with the assistance of a litigation funder, against the directors of a company for the 
sole purpose of facilitating the liquidator to recover his fee and enabling the funder to obtain 
a large success fee.  The liquidator‟s testimony clearly established that his primary aim was 
not to assist the creditors to recover monies owed to them.127 
As this case demonstrates quite clearly, there is potential for abuse of litigation funding 
arrangements.  But this does not justify the adoption of measures likely to discourage the 
funding of litigation by impecunious litigants altogether.  Other existing, less drastic controls 
can be utilised to nip this potential problem in the bud. Indeed, as the majority of the High 
Court of Australia postulated in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif,128 this 
conundrum can be sufficiently addressed by existing doctrines of abuse of process and other 
procedural and substantive elements of the court‟s processes.129  If it is perceived that these 
existing checks are not adequate to deal with the problems arising in connection with 
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litigation funding arrangement, the more appropriate step to take is to introduce regulatory 
measures designed to overcome any identified difficulties in this area, not to adopt measures 
that may have the effect of extinguishing litigation funding arrangements. As Gleeson CJ has 
observed in some extra-curial comments: 
Litigation funding is now with us. Entrepreneurial activity in 
this respect raises issues that have come before the courts. It is 
not in all respects attractive, but subject to certain controls it 
may be a necessity. There is a need for some pragmatism about 
this, because the cost of access to justice is essentially a 
practical matter.130 
Significantly, the Standing Committee of Attorneys General has agreed that further 
consultation and research should be undertaken into issues associated with the regulation the 
litigation funding industry.131 
In order to promote the welfare of shareholders and society as a whole to the fullest extent 
possible, the law should have as one of its objectives to encourage significant amounts of 
shareholder litigation challenging suspected failures to comply with the continuous disclosure 
rules and not to inhibit such actions.   
In light of this, the decision taken by the Commonwealth Government to reform the law with 
a view to easing the regulatory burden imposed on litigation funders and lawyers by the 
Multiplex decision is most appropriate and should be implemented without further delay.  
That reform should make clearer the objectives of the law relating to managed investment 
schemes.  There are strong arguments to support the view that Chapter 5C of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was designed to make provision for the protection of investors 
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in collective investment schemes.  This much can be discerned from the opinions of 
Finkelstein J at first instance and Jacobson J in his dissenting judgment in the Full Federal 
Court in the Multiplex saga.132  These views should be confirmed and adopted by the 
proposed reform. Having clarified the objects of the law in this area, the amendment should 
introduce a specific exclusion for persons providing financial support to litigants seeking to 
vindicate their rights, and the lawyers involved in such litigation, from the regime governing 
managed investment schemes. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Current law, as encapsulated in the Full Federal Court decision in the Multiplex litigation is 
problematic. It subjects persons prepared to financially assist shareholders attempting to 
pursue disclosing entities suspected of having failed to observe the continuous disclosure 
laws, and lawyers prepared to act for such shareholders, to the onerous regulatory regime 
governing managed investment schemes.  This gives rise to some undesirable consequences. 
It is likely to chill the incentive for litigation funders and lawyers to assist impecunious 
shareholders desirous of launching litigation to vindicate their rights following non-disclosure 
of relevant information by disclosing entities.  This is bound to lead to less than optimum 
enforcement of the law.  Just as significant, by discouraging funding, the law, as enunciated 
in Multiplex, will likely impede the use of the class action procedure in these situations.  The 
likely consequence will be the undermining of judicial efficiency.  There is thus need to 
rethink this matter quite seriously and quickly. 
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To catalyse the adoption of sound policies of compliance with the law governing continuous 
disclosure by disclosing entities, it is advisable to reform the law in the manner proposed 
here.  That action, if implemented, will likely encourage litigation funders and lawyers to 
continue to assist private parties (shareholders) desirous of challenging suspected failures to 
observe Australia‟s mandatory disclosure laws.  The proposed reform is advisable 
considering especially that the regulatory burden introduced by the Full Federal Court 
decision is not needed to protect litigants in these types of situations.  
 
